Regulatory Consent Decrees: An Argument
for Deference to Agency Interpretations
Phillip G. Oldhamt
Consent decrees are essentially contracts between litigants
that courts enter as judgments to settle litigation. As judgments,
consent decrees have preemption and enforcement effects that
reach beyond ordinary settlement agreements, yet courts interpret them as simple settlement contracts. But what happens
when an administrative agency enters into a consent decree to
enforce a public welfare statute such as the Clean Water Act?
Should the "agreement" still be understood as a simple contract,
with future interpretations depending solely on a court's interpretation of the wording of the agreement, or do the decree's effects
on third parties and the public at large change its character?
This Comment argues that they do. New understandings of
administrative law mandate a rethinking of how courts interpret
regulatory consent decrees.
Traditionally, judicial review of administrative actions
squared nicely with courts' authority to interpret contracts.
Courts had the final say. The question of who should make
policy, however, was and is central to the relationship between
courts and administrative agencies. In a normative sense, courts
prior to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc.' were much more concerned with "supervising" agency
choices.2 In a post-Chevron world, courts should recognize that
their role is more limited.' Chevron's explicit recognition that
statutory interpretation involves significant policy choices has
changed the legal landscape. Properly understood, Chevron
dissolved the distinctions between law and policy; and, although
still important, the question of who should interpret a document
is now decided less on comparative expertise in legal interpreta-
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tion, and
more upon democratic notions about who should make
4
policy.
Into this new understanding of agency-court relationships
comes increasing agency reliance on consent decrees not only as a
means of settling lawsuits but also as a regulatory tool.5 When
agencies rely on consent decrees to enforce statutes, subsequent
interpretations of these often-ambiguous decrees have important
policy implications.6 The application of contract law to the interpretation of consent decrees may fail to take into account the
public policy concerns specific to the regulatory state. It may also
increase litigation and hamper effective regulation as private
parties try to avoid statutory duties by litigating over ambiguities
in the decree.7
This Comment argues that the fundamental shift in the
relationship between courts and agencies, embodied in Chevron,
should encompass consent decree interpretation. Chevron stands
for the notion that, without specific guidance from Congress,
courts should not interfere with reasonable agency policy
choices-the type of choices often involved in interpreting regula-

" Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071,
2086 (1990). See also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy,
58 Geo Wash L Rev 821, 823 (1990).
' Agencies often use consent decree settlements as a method of statutory enforcement. See Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms:Models Without Meaning, 29
BC L Rev 291, 328, 331 (1988) (referring to consent decrees as "law enforcement tools").
See also Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain:Title VII Consent Decrees
and the Fairnessof Negotiated InstitutionalReform, 1984 Duke L J 887, 888; Jeffery G.
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part II, 14 Envir L Rep
10063, 10080 (1984). Note that this Comment only deals with the situation where an
agency chooses to enforce a statute by entering into a consent decree, and does not concern itself with situations where a consent decree results from a citizen's suit to force
agency action. For a discussion of the latter, see Jeremy A. Rabkin and Neal E. Devins,
Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of
Settlements with the FederalGovernment, 40 Stan L Rev 203 (1987); Note, Separation of
Powers and the Reagan Administration'sPolicy on Consent Decrees: Have the Courts Overstepped the Limits of Judicial Powers?, 1989 U Ill L Rev 541; Larry Kramer, Consent
Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mich L Rev 321 (1988).
e Although interpreting consent decrees as contracts may pose little difficulty in the
private party context, it is problematic in the enforcement of public laws where agencies
use decrees to carry out their statutory mandates. In this context, the contract model
ignores the far-reaching policy implications of court interpretations as well as the
agencies' interests in the efficient enforcement of our public laws. See text accompanying
notes 61-66. See also New York State Ass'n ForRetarded Children,Inc. v Carey, 596 F2d
27, 37 (2d Cir 1979); Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent
Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U Ill L Rev 579, 616.
7 See text accompanying notes 108-09. See also Mengler, 29 BC L Rev at 329 (noting
that ambiguities may be intentionally inserted into a consent decree as a part of the
bargain or to delay enforcement).
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tory consent decrees. Just as Chevron exploded the idea that
courts are best situated to interpret statutes, it should also
revolutionize the interpretation of consent decrees. Consent
decrees in the regulatory realm often involve broader policy
concerns than private contracts. In interpreting these agreements, courts must either ignore policy concerns or make forward-looking judgments about which reading best achieves the
decree's statutory purposes.' The public welfare aspect of interpreting these agreements suggests that neither of these situations is desirable. Under a proper reading of Chevron, interpretation should be left to agencies in which Congress has vested
regulatory authority. Both comparative expertise and political
accountability counsel for this division of labor.9
Part I of this Comment looks at how Chevron fundamentally
changed the way courts view agency interpretation of statutes
and how that thinking has affected areas beyond statutory
interpretation. Part II lays out the general law of consent decrees
in all its confusion and shows the unsatisfactory results of applying current doctrine in regulatory cases. Part III, recognizing the
policy determinations inherent in interpreting consent decrees,
proposes a stylized Chevron test for consent decree interpretation. It also discusses arguments in favor of this deference proposition and attempts to defuse the concern that parties will no
longer enter into these agreements if agency interpretations
receive deference. This Comment concludes that a Chevron-type
deference would lead to more effective regulation and greater
efficiency in the adjudication of consent decree disputes. More importantly, this change in interpretation would lead courts to
respect agency choices, and place regulatory policy back into the
appropriate hands.

8 See text accompanying notes 85-96.
' Agencies, even independent agencies, are typically viewed as more democratically
responsive than the courts. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2087-88 n 80 (cited in note
4) ("[Ihe democratic pedigree of the agency is usually superior to that of the court.");
Silberman, 58 Geo Wash L Rev at 823-24 (cited in note 4). See also Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation:Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J L Econ & Org 81,
95-99 (1985) (arguing that agencies and the executive are actually more democratic than
Congress); Michael A. Fitts, Retaining the Rule of Law in a Chevron World, 66 Chi Kent L
Rev 355, 356-57 (1990) (asserting that agencies are "under the informal control of either a
democratically elected Congress or President").
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I. CHEVRON: DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS
Historically, the fundamental debate among administrative
law scholars has been how to maintain the "rule of law" in the
face of agency policy-making discretion." Traditional common
law notions guided the early period in administrative law, dividing the authority of courts and agencies along the lines of law
and fact-similar to the roles played by judge (law) and jury

(fact)." Questions of law, such as the interpretation of statutes,
were for judges, while questions of fact or policy were to be decided by the agencies. This analysis comported nicely with the understanding in Marbury v Madison that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." 2 However, the line between law and policy in administrative law is blurry, and making distinctions between the two
proved difficult." In Chevron, the Court recognized this difficulty and, marking a doctrinal break from the past, endorsed a
distinct view of the proper relationship between courts and agencies. 4

'0 See Fitts, 66 Chi Kent L Rev at 356 (cited in note 9). See also Maureen B.
Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis L Rev
1275, 1278-79.
" Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J 969,
994 (1992).
12 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also Panel Discussion, JudicialReview of AdministrativeAction in a Conservative Era, 39 Admin L Rev 353, 361 (1987) (Kenneth W.
Starr speaking); Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 283, 293 (cited in note 2).
"3 See Panel Discussion, 39 Admin L Rev at 357-61 (Kenneth W. Starr speaking). See
also Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2082 (cited in note 4); Note, A Framework for Judicial
Review of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation:Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 1985 Duke L J 469, 471; Silberman, 58 Geo Wash L Rev at 823 (cited in
note 4); Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 994-95 (explaining that the law/fact paradigm lasted up
until the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act and, until Chevron, a
multifactored contextual approach was used).
14 See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2087 (cited in note 4). See also Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretationsof Statutory
Provisions, 41 Vand L Rev 301, 302 (1988); Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 284 (cited in note 2).
Chevron has proved to be an extremely influential case. Between 1984 and 1990, the case
was cited over one thousand times. Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2074-75 (cited in note 4).
On the effects of Chevron generally, see Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station:An Empirical Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 Duke L J 984.
Debate continues over the decision's applicability to areas of the law beyond statutory interpretation. Some scholars argue that Chevron embodied a general proposition about deference to
agency policy-making, and as such was not limited simply to questions of statutory interpretation. For a discussion of this position see Callahan, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1286-89.
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A. Facts of Chevron
The Chevron case mirrors the interpretive problem in many
consent decree cases: the documents at hand-whether they are
statutes, legislative history, or consent decrees-simply do not
provide a ready answer to the question litigated. Chevron involved EPA's redefinition of the term "source" in the Clean Air
Act to allow greater permit flexibility by pollution-producing
plants. 5 The D.C. Circuit held that the statute did not warrant
this change in definition. Although the statute was silent on the
proper definition of "source" and the legislative history did not
squarely address the issue, the court held that EPA's new definition was inconsistent with the purpose of the permit program-to
improve air quality. 6
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the D.C. Circuit,
holding that the court had made a mistake in adopting a static
definition of "source" when Congress had not defined the term
that way, and that the court had usurped the agency's authority
to define "source" at its discretion. The language and legislative history of the Clean Air Act gave no guidance as to the proper reading of the word "source." In such instances, the Court
held, it is inappropriate for a reviewing court to decide which
reading best comports with the aim of the statute. That job belongs to the agency. 8
B. The Two-Part Test
Chevron requires courts to defer to an agency's interpretation
of a statute so long as that interpretation does not violate the
statute's plain meaning and is a reasonable reading of silence or
ambiguity in the statute. 9 Chevron set forth a two-part analysis
with which to evaluate any agency action involving a question of
" 467 US at 840. Prior to 1980, "source" had been defined as any pollution-emitting
device in a plant. Thus, if a plant had more than one pollution emitter, modifying any one
of them required a permit. In 1981, however, EPA changed its definition of "source" and
established the "bubble" concept. Under this definition, a new pollution emitter could be
added or an existing one altered without a permit, as long as the change did not increase
the plant's total pollution output. Id.
16 National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v Gorsuch, 685 F2d 718, 720-23 (DC Cir
1982). Note that this problem often arises in consent decree cases: when crafting an
agreement, parties either never consider the contingency at issue or are unclear about

their views.
1
18

Chevron, 467 US at 863-64.
Id at 865-66.

9 Id at 842-44. See also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v Moore, 487 US 354, 380
(1988) (Scalia concurring); Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2074 (cited in note 4).
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statutory interpretation. The first question is whether Congress
gave its view on the issue. If congressional intent is clear, then
courts and the agency are bound to obey Congress. 2 If, however,
the statute and legislative history are silent on the issue, then
courts must assume that Congress intended to delegate discretion to decide the issue to the agency. Courts may only overrule
the agency's interpretation if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."21
C. The Rationale of Chevron
Chevron was based on respect for Congress's decision to vest
regulatory authority in administrative agencies and a desire to
limit judicial policy-making inherent in the interpretation of statutes. As the Court noted, agencies are institutionally superior to
courts as policymakers because courts lack the political accountability and expertise of administrative agencies.' Thus, as long
as an agency acts within its statutory authority, it is better situated to decide these issues.'
Certain assumptions about the proper roles of courts and
administrative agencies underlie the Chevron decision.' Regulation inevitably requires a certain amount of policy-making discretion. This need stems from the difficulties that arise during
the normal course of regulating. Congress cannot possibly antici-

20 467 US at 842-43.
21

Id at 843-44. In determining this,

[tihe court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceedini.
Id at 843 n 11. Commentators have likened this standard to arbitrary-and-capricious
review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2105
(cited in note 4).
' 467 US at 865. Here policy must be understood by reference to those instances
where political accountability and expertise are most relevant. This is different than
policy as it is made by courts in adjudicating disputes because, in this instance, Congress
has empowered an agency with the authority to make national policy over an area of
regulation. By doing so, Congress has spoken on who should make policy on, say, the
environment. Although courts may properly decide the adequacy of such a system under
our Constitution, it is not the province of the courts to "legislate" environmental policy.
That power belongs to EPA, which must make decisions about how to allocate resources
or how best to protect the environment.
2
Id at 865-66.
24 Pauley v United States Department of Labor, 501 US 680, 696 (1991) ("Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial
branches."), citing Chevron, 467 US at 866.

19951

Regulatory Consent Decrees

pate all the contingencies inherent in the regulation of a complex
industry or area of law, but this should not result in a grant of
policy-making discretion to the judiciary. Chevron mandates the
assumption that Congress has given agencies the discretion to
make appropriate policy choices in order to serve their public
functionY5 Thus, unless Congress clearly states its intention to
have courts substantively review agency policy decisions, the
courts' role should only be to "check" and not to supervise or
dictate. 6
D. Generalizing
Interpretation

Chevron: Its

Logic

beyond

Statutory

The Chevron rationale is not necessarily limited to statutory
interpretation. Indeed, the institutional advantages of agencies
apply to a broad range of administrative activities. Recognizing
this, courts have applied Chevron to other areas where broad
policy implications have been found in traditionally "legal" tasks.
1. Applying Chevron to contract interpretation.
Traditionally, courts viewed interpretation of industry contracts as a purely legal endeavor; thus, they reviewed agency
interpretations of contracts de novo
Some courts, however,
have recently applied the principles of Chevron to contract interpretation, holding that it is sufficiently similar to statutory interpretation to warrant deference-especially when the interpreta-

Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2084 (cited in note 4).
See Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 300-01 (cited in note 2). Some commentators have
argued that Chevron deference is constitutionally mandated by the separation-of-powers
doctrine. Callahan, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1286-89 (cited in note 10) (surveying and discussing this view). Justice Scalia, however, has persuasively rejected this position, arguing
that it is a prudential (yet fictive) reconstruction of congressional ambiguity that mandates Chevron deference. Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 514-18. This Comment allies itself with Justice Scalia
insofar as Scalia focuses on the institutional advantages of agencies over courts and not
on actual congressional intent. In other words, because Chevron involved a prudential
fiction about congressional intent, this Comment focuses on the same legitimacy and
expertise concerns as justifications for deference in the context of consent decree interpretation. As was the case in Chevron, courts should impute this intent to Congress in the
absence of explicit evidence to the contrary because it comports more closely with our
conception of what Congress ought to have intended or likely did intend.
' See Boston Edison Co. v Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 856 F2d 361, 363-64
(1st Cir 1988) (declining to choose between de novo review and deference to the agency's
interpretation); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v Shell Oil Co., 363 US 263, 268-70 (1960)
(upholding de nova review of the agency's interpretation of the contract).
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tion involves a policy determination within the agency's statutory
domain.
As the D.C. Circuit has indicated, the main difference between contract interpretation and statutory interpretation is that
the former involves the wishes of private individuals. 29 The involvement of private rights, however, should not limit the influence of Chevron in this area. Statutory interpretations often
affect private interests, indicting conduct made in reliance on
previous interpretations. The D.C. Circuit has noted that:
[TIhe holding in Chevron rests not on the identities of the
individuals whose intentions are in question, but on the fact
that the governing statute explicitly or implicitly embodied
Congress' decision to delegate authority to an agency over
particular matters, thus compelling deference from the
courts in reviewing how the agency exercised its authority
on those matters."0
A reconstruction of congressional intent and an understanding of
the proper role of courts in the regulatory scheme should guide
the discussion concerning consent decrees. The implication of
private rights should not override these considerations. Chevron
itself seems to contemplate putting agency policy choices above
the reliance interests of those regulated.3" The application of
Chevron to contract cases indicates its ability to reform concep-

' National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F2d
1563, 1570 (DC Cir 1987). See also Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 745 F2d 281, 291 (4th Cir 1984); Amoco Production Co. v Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 765 F2d 686, 690 (7th Cir 1985); Southern CaliforniaEdison
Co. v FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, 805 F2d 1068, 1072 (DC Cir 1986).
NationalFuel, 811 F2d at 1570 n 3.
o Id. This case dealt specifically with a settlement contract between two private parties. The D.C. Circuit, supported by some literature, raises the possibility of limiting
Chevron to those instances where the agency is not a party or where there is no danger of
"self dealing." See id at 1571; Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2097, 2101 (cited in note 4)
(discussing judicial deference to agency interpretations of jurisdiction and "agency bias"
generally). This Comment rejects this as an unreasonable limitation on Chevron, arguing
instead that to have meaning, Chevron must apply in cases where the agency, in some
sense, is ruling on its own case. Indeed, any time an agency interprets a statute it has a
duty to enforce, the agency is self-dealing. See MississippiPower & Light Co. v Moore, 487
US 354, 380-82 (1988) (Scalia concurring). In addition, specific safeguards exist in the
regulatory consent decree context that may minimize the effects of agency bias. See generally Part III.
3' Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 300 (cited in note 2). Even though a party may have acted in
reliance on a previous interpretation of a statute, her right to consistency should not override an agency's political choice.
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tions of certain legal arrangements-even a court's role in interpreting the sacrosanct contract.
2. Martin: Interpretation of agency regulations.
In Martin v OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission, the Supreme Court faced conflicting interpretations of a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") 2 The Secretary had issued a citation to an employer for violating a regulation. The
employer appealed to the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission ("OSHRC")-the group responsible for adjudicating
disputes concerning OSHA regulations-which vacated the citation.3" The question in Martin was whether OSHRC (the adjudicator) or the Secretary (the policymaker) should receive deference
in interpreting OSHA regulations.'
Repeating much of the reasoning in Chevron, the Martin
Court stated that the agency must have authoritative power to
interpret its own regulations because application of agency regulations to "complex" and "changing circumstances" requires
"unique expertise" and determinations of "policy making prerogatives."35 Accordingly, the Court held that the Secretary's interpretations of the OSHA regulations should receive deference
because the Secretary has greater policy-making authority and
regulatory expertise than OSHRC." As the Court put it,
[a]lthough the Act does not expressly address the issue, we
now infer from the structure and history of the statute..., that the power to render authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations is a "necessary adjunct" of the
Secretary's powers to promulgate and to enforce national
health and safety standards.
Although never citing Chevron, the Martin Court clearly utilized
Chevron's analytical framework,38 and held that adjudicators

499 US 144, 146 (1991).
Id at 148.
Id at 151.
Id at 150-51.
Id at 152-54.
37 Id at 152.
' See Pauley v United States Department of Labor, 501 US 680, 707-08 (1991) (Scalia
dissenting) ("Having used Chevron to rebuff OSHRC's incursions there [in Martin], it
seems a bit greedy for the Secretary to use Chevron to launch the Labor Department's
own cross-border attack here.").
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should defer to interpretations by those who have policy-making
authorization, better political accountability, and greater expertise in their regulatory area. 9
In other situations where legal interpretations involve
significant policy issues, courts should apply the rationale of
Chevron. Indeed, courts should prefer an agency's interpretations
to their own whenever these interpretations involve regulatory
policy within the agency's statutory authority. ° This understanding recognizes that agencies are institutionally better situated to make policy determinations. Because agency enforcement
by consent decree may also involve policy concerns,4 the Chevron rationale should also apply in that context.
II. CONSENT DECREE INTERPRETATION: CONFUSED PRECEDENT
AND MISAPPLICATION
A. Interpreting Consent Decrees as Contracts
The most obvious problem with interpreting regulatory consent decrees as contracts is that reconstructing an agreement
may not provide a satisfactory answer to the litigated question.
While this may be acceptable in interpreting private agreements,
favoring one plausible interpretation over another in the regulatory context may have broad policy implications that fetter agency discretion. As cases have illustrated, the lack of clarity in
consent decree law exacerbates this problem. Current law leaves
courts faced with differing interpretations largely in the dark. As
one commentator has warned, Supreme Court precedent can be
used to justify almost any interpretive norm."
In United States v Armour & Co., the Supreme Court laid
out the "four corners" rule for interpreting consent decrees.'
Armour treated consent decrees like contracts and implied that

499 US at 152-53.
"' See Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 312 (cited in note 2); Silberman, 58 Geo Wash L Rev at
822-23 (cited in note 4); Pierce, 41 Vand L Rev at 303-04 (cited in note ?).
41 See Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree: An Analysis of
Agency and JudicialDiscretion, 1987 U Chi Legal F 241, 241-42.
"' See Mengler, 29 BC L Rev at 299-300 (cited in note 5) ("No one serious about defining a district court's task in interpreting a consent decree should look to the Supreme
Court for guidance. Because its stated view on interpretation has shifted with the merits
of each case, the Court has charted all the possibilities and fixed its sights on none of
them.").
43 402 US 673 (1971).
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courts should construe them as such.' In an oft-quoted section
of the opinion, the Court stated that:
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the savings of cost and elimination
of risk, the parties each give up something they might have
won had they proceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree
itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties
have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes
as the respective parties have the bargaining power and
skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of a consent
decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by
reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the
parties to it.45
The Court's unwillingness to use external evidence to interpret
consent decrees stems from the adversarial nature of the agreement. Because litigation was the impetus for the agreement, it is
likely that the interests of the two sides to the agreement were
directly opposed to each other when they entered into the consent
decree. Using this reasoning, the Court held that courts should
rarely depart from the specific language of the decree for fear
that post hoc interpretations will favor one party over the oth46
er.
However, in United States v ITT ContinentalBaking Co., the
Court backed away from the strong language of Armour and used
extrinsic evidence to interpret a consent decree that was not
clear on its face.4' In Continental Baking, the United States
sued a baking company for violating a consent decree that the company had entered into to settle antitrust violations.' The decree
prohibited the company from "acquiring" other bakeries for a
specified period of time. 49 The central question of the case was
whether the term "acquiring" referred to a single act subject to a
one-time penalty or permitted daily penalties for continuing to
hold and operate the bakeries that the consent decree prohibited
ITT from buying."0 To answer this question, the Court allowed
" Id at 681-82.
45 Id.

4 Id at 682.
47 420 US 223, 238 (1975).
48

Id at 227-29.

41 Id at 227-28.

5 Id at 225.
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evidence concerning the "circumstances surrounding" the formation of the decree and found that a narrow reading of the word
"acquiring" was inconsistent with the purposes behind the Clayton Act, one of the circumstances surrounding formation of the
decree. Accordingly, the Court held that the agreement permitted
ongoing daily penalties. The opinion, however, limited the use of
extrinsic evidence sharply, stating that the evidence introduced
could not depart from the "four corners" rule of Armour.5 In a
move that seems to contradict an earlier part of the opinion that
allowed courts to consider the purposes behind the Clayton Act in
interpreting consent decrees, the Court stated explicitly that
courts should not construe consent decrees in light of the legislation the government "sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation."52 The Court explained this by saying
that courts were not free to change the wording of a consent
decree simply to further the government's statutory purposes.53
In a strong dissent, Justice Stewart noted that regardless of
its qualifying language, the Court had opened the door to judicial
construction in light of the "antecedent complaint," the "meaning"
of statutory language, and the "underlying policies" the agency
was attempting to enforce.' Stewart maintained that such judicial interpretation would subvert the plain language of decrees
because it would permit parties to argue for the incorporation of
terms for which they did not bargain. This type of interpretation,
Stewart argued, runs counter to the "plain language" standard of
Armour.5 As Stewart predicted, subsequent courts have considered evidence that ranges far outside the "four corners" of the
document."5

61

Id at 238-43.

52

Id at 236-37.

Id at 235-36.
Id at 248-49 (Stewart dissenting) ("Before straining to pull the Government's chestnuts out of the fire, the Court should count with greater care the costs of abandoning the
rule stated in Armour.").
Id at 249-50.
See City of Las Vegas v Clark County, 755 F2d 697, 702 (9th Cir 1985) (construing
consent decree in light of the statute that agency originally sought to enforce); United
States v Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n, 643 F2d 644, 650 (9th Cir 1981) (stating that
courts should construe consent decree according to the purpose of the statute that decree
is intended to enforce); United States v Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Sewer District, 983 F2d 1070 (table), 1993 US App LFXS 855, *16-17 (6th Cir) (construing consent
decree according to the public interest in compliance with the Clean Water Act). See also
Mengler, 29 BC L Rev at 301-03 (cited in note 5) (referring to Continental Baking as
paying "lip service to Armour" while leaving the earlier case "in its wake"); Note, Substantive Standardsand NEPA- MitigatingEnvironmental Consequences with Consent Decrees,
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Stewart's prophecy of unbridled confusion has become a
reality as courts have inconsistently applied Armour and Continental Baking in a variety of settings.57 This is not surprising
given the lack of coherent guidance by the Supreme Court, which
has itself cited the rule of one without acknowledging the other.5" This confusion has exacerbated the problems of applying
the contract model in the regulatory setting. Although it is not
very troublesome for courts to exercise discretion in interpreting
consent decrees of private litigants, extending that discretion in
the regulatory context impinges upon authority that properly
belongs to an administrative agency. Chevron requires a different
result: when Congress has not spoken clearly to the contrary,
courts should prefer an agency's policy choices, even as expressed
through interpretation of an agreement.
Continental Baking itself provides support for this proposition. Although Continental Baking was nominally about the use
of extrinsic evidence to interpret a decree, the Court was clearly
influenced by the purposes of the Clayton Act59 in reaching its
conclusion." In a post-Chevron world, the decision of which
reading best comports with the goals of federal antitrust policy
should be viewed as a question best left to agency interpretation.
B. Interpreting
Policymakers

Regulatory

Consent

Decrees:

Courts

as

Interpreting consent decrees in the administrative context
differs markedly from interpreting decrees between private litigants."' These differences stem from the statutory authorizations given to administrative agencies, 2 public concerns for effi18 BC Envir Aft L Rev 159, 170 (1990) ("Regardless of the justification, the Court readily
adopted a broader interpretation of the decree to conform to statutory objectives.").
s Mengler, 29 BC L Rev at 304-05 (cited in note 5).
See Firefightersv Stotts, 467 US 561, 574 (1984). See also Mengler, 29,BC L Rev at
304 (cited in note 5) (noting that Stotts "returns to the language and spirit of Armour" but
does not criticize Continental Baking).
" Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub L No 63-212, 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified at 15 USC §§
12-27 (1988 & Supp 1992).
6

420 US at 237.

See United States v Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Sewer District, 983 F2d
1070 (table), 1993 US App LEXIS 855, *16-17 (6th Cir), citing Heath v DeCourcy, 888 F2d
1105, 1109 (6th Cir 1989) ("Consent decrees which regulate institutional conduct are fundamentally different from consent decrees between private parties.... The decrees reach
beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public's right to the
sound and efficient operation of its institutions."); United States v O'Rourke, 943 F2d 180,
188 (2d Cir 1991); Navarro-Ayala v Hernandez-Colon, 951 F2d 1325, 1337-38 (1st Cir
1991).
' Before a court can enter a consent decree, it must find that the decree will "further
6
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cient administration,63 possible effects on third parties not involved in the decrees,' and the comparative expertise of agencies in making policy decisions.65 Indeed, to properly balance
these concerns, courts must make sensitive judgments on issues
that may be fundamental to an administrative scheme. For instance, some courts have held that a court must interpret a regulatory consent decree in light of the requirements of the statute
under which the agency sued. 6 This rule of construction draws
consent decree interpretation close to the Chevron standard because both approaches require a reading of the statute at issue
and will often require a judgment about which policy choice best
comports with the statutory goals. In contrast, if a court does not
take into account the statute under which the agency acted, important policy objectives may be ignored. Thus, under the contract model of interpretation, courts will either ignore the important policy implications of their decisions or make policy decisions that properly belong to an agency.
In entering and monitoring regulatory consent decrees,
judges have become much more than mere interpreters of settlement contracts. One commentator has remarked upon the increasingly proactive role of judges interpreting regulatory decrees:
[Iun actively shaping and monitoring the decree, mediating
between the parties, developing his own sources of expertise
and information, the trial judge has passed beyond even the
role of
legislator and has become a policy planner and man67
ager.

the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based." Firefighters u Cleveland,
478 US 501, 525 (1985), citing EEOC v Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F2d 795, 799 (10th Cir
1979). See also Citizens for a Better Environment v Gorsuch, 718 F2d 1117, 1125, 1128
(DC Cir 1983).
' See Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Sewer District, 1993 US App LEXIS 855
at *16-17.
" See Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and
FederalEnvironmental Policy Making, 1987 U Chi Legal F 327, 348.
See text accompanying notes 22-41.
See City of Las Vegas v Clark County, 755 F2d 697, 702 (9th Cir 1985); United
States v Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n, 643 F2d 644, 650 (9th Cir 1981); Louisville
and Jefferson County Metro Sewer District, 1993 US App LEXIS 855 at *16-17.
' Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev
1281, 1302 (1976). The Continental Baking decision is a good example of the types of
decisions that judges must make under the current regime: do ongoing penalties best
serve federal antitrust policy? See text accompanying notes 59-60.
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One has to wonder whether Congress intended agencies to be
able to delegate such broad policy-making authority to the judiciary merely by entering into an agreement with a private party.' The following Section demonstrates the gravity of attributing that understanding to Congress.
1. The possible breadth of regulatory consent decrees.
In 1982, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia entered a consent decree settling an antitrust suit
between the United States Department of Justice ("Justice De-.
partment") and AT&T. "9 The consent decree attempts to foster
competition by requiring AT&T to provide companies other than
the regional Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") equal access to
the interexchange and information services markets, and by
imposing limitations on the entry of BOCs into other
nonregulated markets where they might have monopolistic tendencies."
There is little doubt that the D.C. District Court has been
significantly involved in setting regulatory policy through the
consent decree. The goal of the decree is to foster competition.'
In light of this, Part VII of the decree authorizes the court to
modify the decree to further the enforcement of its goals. 2 Since
entry of the consent decree, the D.C. District Court has ruled on
many issues regarding the relationship between AT&T, the
BOCs, and other telecommunications providers. 3 Although the
Justice Department has committed a great deal of resources to
studying the effects of the decree and making recommendations

' The question of whether this intention can be attributed to Congress is important
because Chevron calls for a fictive yet plausible reconstruction of congressional intent. The
implausibility of attributing this intention to Congress indicates that current law on this
subject is out of line with Chevron. See note 26.
See UnitedStates v AT&T, 552 F Supp 131 (D DC 1982).
70 Id at 140-43. See also Michael E. DeBow, Judicial Regulation of Industry: An
Analysis of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 1987 U Chi Legal F 353, 364-65. Essentially, the
decree separated the BOCs from AT&T and allowed AT&T to maintain its long-distance
and equipment-manufacturing businesses, subject to equal-access restrictions. The decree
also established "line of business" restrictions that prohibited the BOCs from entering into
competition with AT&T in certain areas including interexchange (long distance), manufacturing, information services, and several nontelecommunications lines of business. These
restrictions may be lifted if BOCs show that activity within those areas will not impede
competition or create dangers of monopoly. Id.
7 United States v Western Electric, 900 F2d 283, 290 (DC Cir 1990) (triennial review
of antitrust consent decree).
72 Id at 291.
DeBow, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 366.
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to the district court,74 it is the district court, subject to appellate
review, that approves or disapproves waivers to or changes in the
decree.7 5
Thus, as the D.C. Circuit noted in United States v Western
Electric Co., although government policy positions, as articulated
by the FCC and the Justice Department, have changed with
administrations, the court has been free to accept or reject these
positions as it sees fit.76 In rejecting the petitions for BOC entry
into certain lines of business, the district court has relied on its
own view of what best promotes antitrust policy, rejecting the
Justice Department's recommendations.7 7 In essence, a federal
court, not responsible to any constituency and with no congressional mandate or relevant expertise, regulates the telecommunications industry through a consent decree.78
Although the AT&T decree is unusual in its scope, Western
Electric is an .instructive example of the amount and type of
policy-making discretion that consent decrees can confer on
courts.79 Subsequent cases confirm the troubling fact that, in
interpreting regulatory consent decrees, courts are making policy
decisions that may not properly belong to the judiciary." At the
very least, it is unclear whether Congress intended the courts to
exercise this much discretion over regulatory policy.
Courts and commentators share this uneasiness over a
policy-making judiciary."' As the D.C. Circuit explained in West74 Id.

' United States v Western Electric, 969 F2d 1231, 1235 & n 6 (DC Cir 1992).
76 900 F2d at 298.

7 Decisions to reject the Justice Department's recommendations have been based
largely upon one judge's, the Honorable Harold H. Greene's, interpretation of the
procompetition and antimonopoly requirements of the decree, as well as his views on
which policies will best encourage competition. Id at 297-98. After noting recent changes
in scholarly views on antitrust policy, the D.C. Circuit stated:
[W]e recognize that the DOJ may change its views-to incorporate different policy
concerns-over time. That is not to say that we do not have any sympathy for the
district court's attitude toward the DOJ's position changes in this Triennial Review....

With little warning the DOJ completely altered its stance and is now gen-

erally hostile toward the [line-of-business] restrictions.
Id at 298. The D.C. Circuit recognized the distinct policy issues involved in interpreting
the consent decree and upheld the district court judge's authority to reject the Justice
Department's recommendations on the line-of-business restrictions. Id.
7 DeBow, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 365-66 (cited in note 70).
79 See also Adams v Bell, 711 F2d 161, 162-63 (DC Cir 1983) (noting that since a
1973 consent decree was entered, the D.C. District Court has taken an active role in
delineating the Department of Education's responsibilities in enforcing Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act).
See text accompanying notes 85-96.
81 See DeBow, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 366 (cited in note 70); Browning-FerrisIndus-
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ern Electric, the Justice Department has primary enforcement
authority for the Sherman Antitrust Act.82 Although the court
found no doctrinal or statutory reason for deference, it recognized
the importance of agency input and suggested that the district
court "seriously consider the Department's economic analysis and
predictions of market behavior" when interpreting the consent
decree.' This quotation expresses the obvious tension between
the theory of contract-based interpretation of consent decrees and
the reality that a court with no expertise, constituency, or statutory authority may ultimately set regulatory policy.'
2. Ambiguities in consent decrees: Opportunities for judicial
policy-making.
Consent decrees that are ambiguous or silent on issues that
arise subsequent to entry of the decree pose significant problems
for courts. Reconstructing the bargain often provides little guidance and results in poor policy choices. The difficulty of balancing
all the competing interests present in an administrative consent
decree and the confused state of consent decree jurisprudence has
led courts to apply the contract model inconsistently. In spite of
their efforts, courts' good-faith attempts to reconstruct the
parties' intent do not eradicate the central problem with the
backward-looking approach of the contract-based model. Most
often what is needed is a forward-looking policy decision-the
type of decision that agencies are better situated to make.
For example, in United States v Louisville and Jefferson
County MetropolitanSewer District, EPA discovered that a plant
of the Metropolitan Sewer District ('MSD") was in violation of its
permit requirements.8 5 As a result of these violations, MSD
tries v Muszynksi, 899 F2d 151, 163-64 (2d Cir 1990).
900 F2d at 297.

' Id. See also BroadcastMusic, Inc. v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc., 441 US 1,
16 (1979) (cautioning against disregarding the Justice Department's interpretation of antitrust law).
' In response to this tension, Senator Robert Dole introduced a bill to put federal
regulatory authority of the telecommunications industry in the hands of the FCC. Federal
Telecommunications Policy Act of 1986, S 2565, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (June 16, 1986), in
132 Cong Rec S7742 (June 18, 1986). The FCC would then be required to promulgate a
set of regulations that mirrored those in the AT&T consent decree, thereby allowing the
parties to make motions to vacate the decree on the grounds that a new regulatory
authority made the continued existence of the decree unnecessary. Although the bill was
never enacted, it indicates dissatisfaction with courts exercising this much regulatory
authority. For a discussion of the bill, see DeBow, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 366 (cited in
note 70).
8 983 F2d 1070 (table), 1993 US App LEXIS 855, *2 (6th Cir).
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faced civil penalties of $10,000 per day." EPA filed an enforcement action against MSD and over the next two years negotiated a consent decree whereby MSD would take several steps to
bring its plant into compliance."7 In return for these measures,
EPA agreed not to pursue stipulated penalties so long as MSD
continued to make substantial efforts to comply with the appropriate effluent standards."
Subsequent litigation between EPA and MSD focused on
whether the purposes of the decree had been fulfilled when MSD
had come into compliance with its permit.'m EPA believed that
the purposes of the decree would be fulfilled immediately upon
compliance with the effluent levels established in MSD's permit.
MSD argued that the decree should not end until all work specified in the decree had been carried out in order to keep the plant
in compliance given foreseeable increases in sewage flow. The decree was silent on this question."
Although the court ultimately held for EPA, its backwardlooking attempt to reconstruct the agreement is strained and
unprincipled.9 The problem was that reconstructing the agreement provided no answer to the question being litigated. Both
sides had good arguments for why, ex ante, they would not have
agreed to the other side's position. EPA, however, had compelling
policy reasons for rejecting MSD's interpretation: the efficient
enforcement of the Clean Water Act may have been at stake.9 2

Id, citing 33 USC § 1319(d) (1988).
1993 US App LEXIS 855 at *2-3. MSD would first conduct an "Interim Corrective
Action Program" to ascertain if minor improvements could bring the plant into compliance
and an 'Evaluation Program" to determine the feasibility and efficiency of alternative
improvements. If these studies showed that MSD could not bring its plant into compliance
without major modifications, then MSD would submit a "Final Plan and Schedule" detailing the necessary changes and equipment needed. This plan would then be submitted to
the EPA and carried out if approved. Id.
Id at *3-4.
Id at *11-12.
Id at *2-4.
" Indeed, in a strongly worded dissent, Chief Judge Merritt accused the majority of
failing to properly divine the parties' intent, offering his own plausible reading of the
agreement. Id at *18-19.
2 The decree gave protection to MSD for daily violations of permit levels. MSD
wanted to remain under this protection while it made improvements in its facility to
process greater levels of effluent. It argued that the decree made little sense if its requirements would be lifted the moment that the MSD plant achieved compliance with its
permits. Theoretically MSD could fall out of compliance the next day and EPA would be
forced to bring an additional enforcement action. EPA disagreed with this, stating that
allowing the plant to make improvements for new customers while it was under the
protection of the decree was unfair to other competitors and would set a bad precedent for
dealing with other plants operating under consent decrees. Id at *11-13, *19.
'7
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This problem is not limited to a single context. In one AT&T
case, the D.C. District Court read the term "manufacturer" as it
pertained to line-of-business restrictions on the BOCs as excluding the BOCs from the design and development business.93 The
language of the agreement was, however, inconclusive. With little
evidence as to what the parties meant by "manufacture," the
court turned to the purpose of the agreement and held that allowing the BOCs to participate in design and development was,
on balance, more dangerous to competition than keeping them
out.' Although the court made a good-faith effort to reconstruct
the agreement, it essentially made a policy judgment that had
little to do with what the parties agreed to or what the language
evinced. In this case, as in others, reconstructing the agreement
did not provide an answer to the question."
Cases like these illustrate the problems inherent in interpreting regulatory consent decrees. Often an appeal to the language or context surrounding the agreement is only a stab in the
dark. When this is the case, a court will be forced to adopt what
it believes to be a sensible reading in light of the statutory landscape. These interpretive scenarios create a great deal of uncertainty, making it difficult for both the regulators and the reg-

United States v Western Electric Co., 675 F Supp 655 (D DC 1987).
United States v Western Electric Co., 894 F2d 1387, 1391 (DC Cir 1990).
9' See also United States v Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n, 643 F2d 644 (9th Cir
1981). In that case, the government sought an extension of an antitrust consent decree
that promoted competition between automobile manufacturers producing air pollution
control devices. Id at 647. The decree was to last only ten years but allowed the government to petition the court for an extension. Id at 646. However, the decree was completely
silent on what factors the court should consider in granting or denying an extension. Id at
651. At first, the district court granted the government's petition, reading the decree's
language as giving the government a unilateral right to an extension. Id at 646-47. Soon
after, however, the district court entered a memorandum reversing its earlier decision,
holding that, due to a changed regulatory climate, the decree was no longer warranted. Id
at 647. The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's decision and remanded for a
proper reconstruction of the parties' agreement. Admitting that the consent decree was
silent on the issue, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had not properly reconstructed the agreement and should decide the extension issue "against a backdrop of
findings which include the parties' reasonable expectations and understandings[J, ... the
statutory framework under which the government originally brought the action, and a
balancing of the equities in light of the aforementioned considerations." Id at 651-52.
Ultimately, there is no way to answer the question of extending the decree without
evaluating its policy rationales. Here the government felt that the expiration of the decree
would be fatal to competition in the air pollution control equipment market. Id at 648.
Whether a court could prove or disprove the government's position is largely irrelevant.
The petition for an extension may best be understood as a policy view about what is
required to continue to protect competition in the air pollution control area-an area that
the then-current Administration obviously felt was very important.
'
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ulated to predict judicial decisions on the basis of regulatory
policies.
It is important to note that a consent decree is itself an expression of policy. Although a court's authority to enter and enforce the decree comes from the agreement, the agency's authority to offer and accept a consent decree settlement in the first
place comes from Congress. Thus, as in Chevron, one must try to
reconstruct plausible congressional intent in granting the statutory authority to settle litigation through consent decrees. When
Congress gave agencies this authority, it most likely did not
intend to give significant policy-making authority to courts. Yet
for the contract theory of interpreting regulatory consent decrees
to make any sense, one must believe that Congress wanted agencies to be able to delegate a significant portion of their policymaking discretion to a court by making an agreement with a
private party. In fact, Chevron seems to have made such a conception of congressional intent untenable in the absence of clear
language to that effect. It is much more plausible to argue that
Congress, in giving agencies the authority to settle litigation by
decree, intended for agencies to retain this discretion."6

' One recent case endorsed a similar view with regard to administrative consent
orders, agreements between an agency and a party that settle administrative rather than
judicial disputes. See Browning-FerrisIndustries v Muszynski, 899 F2d 151 (2d Cir 1990).
In that case, the Second Circuit faced an administrative consent order, agreed to by both
Browning and EPA, involving a site cleanup under § 7003 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA!), 42 USC § 6973 (1988). The RCRA Consent Order included a
program requiring monitoring wells, but failed to specify what type of material was required to be used in the wells. 899 F2d at 152. As the court noted,

loin the merits this case presents a narrow issue: can the EPA exercise its discretion
pursuant to its expertise in environmental matters to require the installation of
stainless steel rather than PVC wells to monitor ground water pollution, when the
parties have voluntarily agreed that wells of some kind are required but have not
specified the type of material?
Id at 160.
The court accorded the consent order little weight, properly recognizing that a reconstruction of the agreement would be of little help. The court also noted that Congress has
delegated to EPA the responsibility for the cleanup of hundreds of landfills and hazardous
waste sites throughout the country and concluded that:
[t]he judicial system lacks the resources and the expertise to address every scientific
dispute that might arise from EPA's actions. The monitoring process chosen by EPA
in this instance is within the normal discretion of an administrative agency interpreting a voluntary agreement-the RCRA Order.
Id at 163-64. The court's holding demonstrates an understanding that the order's silence
should not automatically put the court into the position of policymaker, a position outside
its normal adjudicative role.
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III. REPLACING THE CONTRACT MODEL WITH CHEVRON
The primary difficulty in consent decree cases is that courts
are trying to fit modern administrative exigencies into traditional
contract models. Applying contract principles to regulatory consent decrees provides little guidance to courts and litigants and
results in ineffective regulation. 7 Chevron provides a framework
to correct this problem. It makes little sense to hold that agencies
are competent to interpret their own statutes but not consent
decrees enacted to enforce those same laws.
A. The Stylized Chevron Test
This Comment proposes that courts use a stylized Chevron
analysis to interpret regulatory consent decrees. Under this test,
the court must first determine whether the agency interpretation
is outside the plain meaning of the agreement. If it is, then the
plain meaning of the agreement should govern. If it is not, then
the court should uphold the agency interpretation as a policy
judgment so long as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the agreement or statute at issue. This deferential
standard will put policy-making back into the hands of the agency and reestablish the proper role of courts as checks on agency
action."
1. Step one: In the face of clear language.
Because the consent decree itself is properly understood as
an expression of policy, the court must try to be faithful to the
language of that expression. If the language is clear, then the
agency should be held to that expression of policy unless significant changes in the regulatory environment have occurred.' As
commentators have noted in the Chevron context, this first step
is not toothless because very often the language of the agreement
' This is especially true when the contract model at issue is so completely malleable.
See text accompanying notes 42-60.
' This policy-making realignment relies on a reading of Chevron that allows courts
to make plausible yet fictive assumptions about congressional intent in the light of arguments about which body (the agency or the court) is best situated to make a particular
determination. See note 26. Applying a Chevron-style analysis will have the additional
advantage of allowing agencies to "update" decrees that have become obsolete. See
DeBow, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 357-62 (cited in note 70) (discussing the problem of obsolescence).
' Changed circumstances is the current standard for altering a consent decree, even
over the protest of a party to the decree. See Firefightersv Cleveland 478 US 501, 527-28
(1985).
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at issue is precise.' A firm adherence to the plain language of
a consent decree will strike the proper balance between allowing
for agency discretion and holding the agency to the clearly articulated expectations of the parties to the agreement. This plainlanguage test should resolve those cases in which the meaning of
the decree is obvious on its face and the agency is advocating a
purely post hoc reinterpretation of its original bargain.'0 '
2. Step two: Arbitrary-and-capricious review.
The review for arbitrariness should closely mirror arbitraryand-capricious review under Chevron, largely based on the standard articulated in the Administrative Procedure Act. 1 2 As in
the Chevron context, agency interpretations will not always pass
this test.'
Arbitrary-and-capricious review would give the
agency wide latitude to make policy decisions but would not allow unbridled discretion; if the agency interpretation is so unreasonable as to be outside its authority under the agreement or
statute, it will be rejected. Accordingly, this inquiry would require the agency to provide a detailed explanation of its interpretation and the factors that went into its policy decision. The factors must be relevant to the underlying statute, and the explanation must be reasonable. This test will ensure that the agency
has drawn a rational conclusion after examining the relevant information."'

See Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 298 (cited in note 2) ("Despite its strengthening of the
deference principle, however, Chevron has not made judicial review a dead letter. On the
contrary, as the Court's own post-Chevron decisions demonstrate, application of the Chevron framework-particularly in its first step--continues to be a potent check on agency
interpretations."); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 520-21 (cited in note 26); Sunstein, 90 Colum
L Rev at 2091-92 (cited in note 4).
'0' This should allay many of the fears articulated in both the Stewart dissent in Continental Baking, 420 US at 249, and the Merritt dissent in Louisville and Jefferson County
Metro Sewer District, 1993 US App LEXIS 855 at *17-19.
102 For an articulation of the standard of review under the Administrative Procedure
Act, see Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 463 US 29, 43 (1983). For the Chevron standard, see Silberman, 58 Geo Wash L Rev
at 827-28 (cited in note 4).
1
See Associated Gas Distributors v Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 893 F2d
349, 359, 361 (DC Cir 1989) (using the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to overturn
agency interpretations); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 811 F2d 1563, 1572 (DC Cir 1987) (asserting that Chevron does not require abdication on the part of the court, but merely deference). See also Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev
at 2105 (cited in note 4) (arguing that "some decisions will be reversed or remanded under
this approach").
1
In this way, the test will comport with what courts require whenever they review
an agency's policy decisions. See State Farm, 463 US at 43 ("Normally, an agency rule
1"
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This two-part test accords with the theory underlying Chevron on several levels. As the D.C. Circuit has pointed out,
Chevron's force is not limited to questions of statutory interpretation.'
Certainly it seems implausible that Congress wanted
agencies to delegate their discretion to courts through agreements with third parties. Even if private rights are implicated, a
plausible reconstruction of congressional intent may counsel for
deference in reviewing agency interpretations of regulatory consent decrees.1" Applying the principles of Chevron to this context makes sense because the agency's advantages in electoral accountability, expertise, and policy-making legitimacy apply equally to the interpretation of regulatory consent decrees.
B. Arguments

for Deference to Agency

Interpretations

of

Regulatory Consent Decrees
1. Savings in social costs.
Deference to agency interpretations of consent decrees will
likely produce significant social benefits: more effective regulation, a decrease in litigation costs, and more accountable decision
making. First and foremost, deference to agency interpretations
will create more effective regulation. One by-product of applying
contract principles to ambiguous consent decrees is an increase in
private parties' ability to delay enforcement. Assuming that a
decree protects a private party from the imposition of any penalties so long as it is in force,0 7 the party may litigate any and
all ambiguous terms in the decree to avoid regulatory requirements. Deference to the agency's interpretation of the decree will
forestall this delay tactic and thus increase enforcement of regulatory statutes. An example may clarify this point.

would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise."); Associated Gas Distributors,893 F2d at 361 (applying State Farm to
an agency interpretation of a settlement agreement). See also Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 307
(cited in note 2).
"' See generally text accompanying notes 27-41. See also Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 30001 (cited in note 2).
'
Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 300-01 (cited in note 2).
0 See, for example, Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Sewer District, 1993 US
App LEXIS 855 at *11-12; Harrisv City of Philadelphia,1994 US App LEXIS 27241, *4-6
(3d Cir).
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Often a consent decree stipulates an ongoing relationship
between the two parties, such as in the MSD case.'08 If this is
so, the decree may require extensive studies about possible alternatives to rectify a statutory violation. For example, in the MSD
case, the decree might have stipulated that an independent third
party conduct a study that, when substantially completed, would
be used to determine whether ambient-water-quality standards
required additional oxygenation of MSD's sewage discharge.
Without specific language in the decree about who is to conduct
the study, how it will be conducted, and in what time frame,
MSD could litigate every one of these issues, thereby substantially delaying any action on their part. This would greatly hamper
EPA's ability to enforce the Clean Water Act by both increasing
delays and raising the cost of obtaining compliance. There is the
added result that a court, perhaps wholly lacking in expertise
and accountability, will decide these important technical issues.
As the case discussions in Part II illustrate, this scenario is not
uncommon, and it does not serve the public's interest in efficient
regulation. A deference model will both better serve the regulatory interests of the public and decrease this type of litigation.
Second, deference will reduce litigation costs. Parties under a
consent decree will be less apt to go to court if they know that a
court will most likely find the agency's interpretation "reasonable." For example, if MSD knows that the agency's interpretation of the language concerning the oxygenation study is reasonable, then MSD will be unlikely to expend resources to put the
question to a court. This will result in less litigation after the
consent decree is entered. °9
Additionally, because the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
requires less costly court education, it will probably decrease the
costs of litigation once in court. Under the contract model, courts
with little knowledge of the regulatory landscape and the technical information involved must be educated before they can determine the proper circumstances or technical issues surrounding
the formation of a consent decree. Under the deference standard,
courts will not need such intimate knowledge of the regulatory
system.
10

See text accompanying notes 85-92.

1

For another example of this possibility, see the discussion of the Browning case in

note 96. If a similar issue arises again, Browning will probably not litigate it. After this
case, Browning knows that reasonable agency judgments about what the "consent order"
requires will receive deference, and therefore will not expend resources litigating that
type of claim.
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There are two types of technical expertise that an agency
may possess. The first can be understood as a comprehensive
understanding of the general regulatory landscape. This includes
statutory interactions as well as standard operating procedures
among the different players within the regulated area. The second is knowledge of the nuts and bolts of the regulated area-the
science, technology, and economics that an agency uses to formulate policies and make judgments. Both types of knowledge are
specialized and require experience and training. At least one
commentator, recognizing these problems, has argued that instead of expanding agency discretion, courts should become sufficiently educated to make these sorts of determinations."1
Educating courts, however, may be undesirable. First, educating courts is an extremely expensive undertaking. To educate
judges on either regulatory or scientific concerns during a trial
greatly increases the cost of litigation."' Second, although
judges are certainly capable of understanding overall industry
practices or industry "science,""' these practices and technologies change rapidly over time."' Thus, judges must obtain, at
substantial cost, the same education that administrators obtain
incidental to the performance of their duties. Congress created
administrative agencies to regulate certain sectors of society and
staffed them with experts. It would be odd if courts were not allowed-as they often are not under the contract model of consent
decree interpretation-to take advantage of agency knowledge
and expertise. Although judges will need to know something
about regulatory concerns to conduct arbitrary-and-capricious
review, the knowledge needed is minimal. Therefore, the necessary knowledge would be cheaper to obtain than if the judges
were required actually to make the policy decision themselves."

11'

See Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of

Bureaucracy 238-39 (Yale, 1990).
. See Note, FightingFire with Firefighters:A Proposalfor Expert Judges at the Trial
Level, 93 Colum L Rev 473, 482-83 (1993) (recognizing the expense inherent in educating
judges in technical matters). See also Stephen Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59 Tulane L
Rev 4, 10-11 (1984) (recognizing the limits on the ability of parties to properly educate
judges on technical matters).
1
In this context, "science" refers to both the specialized knowledge of a particular
area of administration and the technology of the industry under regulation.
113 See Western Electric, 900 F2d at 297-98.
11 See Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 462
US 87, 103 (1983); Browning-FerrisIndustries v Muszynski, 899 F2d 151, 164 (2d Cir
1990); Department of Navy v Egan, 484 US 518, 529 (1988); Hahn v Gottlieb, 430 F2d
1243, 1249 (1st Cir 1970). See also the discussion of the Browning case in note 96. It is far
more difficult for a court to decide which type of monitoring well is intended by a consent
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Finally, deference will result in better decision making because agencies have more expertise and greater electoral accountability. Evidence suggests that courts are relatively more likely
to make mistakes-whether from failing to fully appreciate the
complexity of the regulatory landscape, or misinterpreting scientific data-in choosing policy. As one commentator explains, there
are numerous problems in drawing any kind of conclusive answers from data."5 These interpretative problems are exacerbated in the consent decree context when the decision maker is
not well versed in regulatory minutia. For example, in many
instances the evidence is not sufficient to provide a reliable answer; however, determining when this is the case requires a
great deal of specialized knowledge."' Furthermore, even if data is adequate, experts often differ on what the data means."'
Questions of methodology will often control how far a particular
expert will extend the conclusions. Perhaps most importantly, experts differ over the inferences to draw from the data."8 Here
the disparity between different experts is the widest. It may
make little sense to rely on judges to make decisions between
competing expert judgments given the likelihood that they will
make less-informed choices." 9
Judges may also choose poorly in a democratic sense. Given
that certain answers may not be "right" or "wrong" in an objective sense, judges who are not responsible to the populace may
choose against the will of the people. This was a central concern
in Chevron.20 Where policy issues are concerned, it is better to
have an agency with relatively more expertise and greater electoral ties make those decisions. The fact that agencies have a
comparative advantage in determining the effects of a given policy over time, both objectively and democratically, counsels for
court deference to agency interpretations of consent decrees.
agreement than whether a particular type of well is acceptable or reasonable.
"' Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67
Georgetown L J 729, 734 (1979).
116 Id at 736-37.
11 Id at 740. This is illustrated by the problem of competing expert witnesses in court
actions. Often, demeanor and presentation will make more of a difference on a decision
than the information presented.
,8 Id at 743.
"'
Although some judges have become well educated in the antitrust and labor
contexts, others have recognized their relative lack of expertise in other areas. See Baltimore Gas, 462 US at 103; Browning, 899 F2d at 164; Egan, 484 US at 529; Hahn, 430
F2d at 1249.
0 467 US at 866.
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2. No more regulatory consent decrees?
Perhaps the most important concern that arises from this
proposal is whether deference to agency interpretations of consent decrees would significantly decrease incentives to enter into
consent decree agreements. If an agency is allowed to reinterpret
the bargain at will, critics argue, then parties will be reluctant to
21
enter into the agreement, and overall litigation will increase.
Although this argument makes some intuitive sense, it ignores
the reality of many regulatory situations and fails to recognize
the other advantages in decreased litigation and
decreased litiga22
tion costs that counsel in favor of deference.
First, agencies should be willing to adjust their settlement
offers in order to make them more attractive to parties concerned
about the effects of unforeseen or changed circumstances. Even if
the terms of the decrees tended to be less favorable for the agencies, it would still be in their interests to settle their disputes
with consent decrees." Given the probability of an adverse
court ruling, higher penalties imposed by a court, and less flexibility in both time frame and solution, private parties should also
be willing to enter into adequately adjusted consent decrees.

Percival, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 344 (cited in note 64). Note that very little empirical evidence exists concerning the advantages of settlement through consent decree.
See generally Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U Chi Legal F 43, 67-85. Commentators have made several claims about the general benefits of consent decrees. First, they
argue that consent decrees shorten costly and time-consuming litigation, freeing agency
resources for other uses. Second, consent decrees allow for more closely tailored solutions
than a court could provide. Third, consent decrees create more effective and "cheaper"
enforcement due to continued court oversight, and thus create more effective regulation.
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contractin ConsentJudgments, 1987 U
Chi Legal F 19, 25; Mengler, 29 BC L Rev at 314, 328, 331 (cited in note 5); Note, United
States v. Fisher: "Posner'sDilemma"and the Uncertain Triumph of Outcome Over Process,
21 Envir L 427, 434-35 (1991); Percival, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 334 (cited in note 64);
Firefightersv Cleveland, 478 US 501, 523-24 n 13 (1985). Although these arguments have
intuitive appeal, others have argued persuasively that consent decrees do not necessarily
decrease the incidence or costs of litigation nor increase the effectiveness of regulation.
See generally Kramer, 87 Mich L Rev at 327-28 (cited in note 5); Owen M. Fiss, Justice
Chicago Style, 1987 U Chi Legal F 1; Resnik, 1987 U Chi Legal F 43. For discussions
concerning the problems of settlement generally, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
Yale L J 1073 (1984); Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, Soc Phil & Policy 102 (Autumn 1986).
122 See text accompanying notes 109-14.
1
See Easterbrook, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 25 ("Still, if the SEC catches Ivan Boesky
in the act, a settlement and consent decree can make both better off: both avoid the
protracted litigation that would eat up much of the $100 million stake; the SEC obtains a
pile of money it can distribute, and it frees up its legal staff for other work. The consensual disposition both enforces the legal rule and leaves benefits for the parties to share.").
121
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This possibility is increased in the regulatory setting by the
fact that there is often better information about possible settlement ranges. For example, consider that many regulatory statutes are strict liability laws. 2 4 Given their limited resources,
administrative agencies rarely file enforcement proceedings unless they have ample evidence of statutory violations.' Thus defendants do not face a normal guilt-or-innocence paradigm.'2 6 The
question is often not whether they will have to pay but how
much. Given that both the agencies and the violators are fully
aware of the affirmative defenses and penalties for violations,
agencies can usually make offers that are superior to what the
violating parties could expect from a court. 7
Second, both the language of the agreement and the arbitrary-and-capricious standard will serve to protect the interests
of defendants in these cases. As the D.C. Circuit has observed in
the contract setting, deference to agency interpretations may
make the agreements more explicit. 2 ' Although this may increase the costs of bargaining, subsequent savings in litigation
costs may be greater. As Judge Robert Bork has noted: "Indeed, if
judicial deference to the Commission forces greater clarity in
settlement agreements, with less subsequent litigation, efficiency
will be increased for private parties as well as for the regulatory
system."'29 This systemic effect has been discussed in the
Chevron context as well: if the primary method that Congress
has to cabin agency discretion is statutory language, that lan-

124

See Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative

Analysis, 20 BC Envir Aff L Rev 579, 598-99 (1993) (indicating the strict liability of the
Clean Water Act and CERCLA). See also United States v Northeastern Pharmaceutical&
Chemical Co., 810 F2d 726, 743-45 (8th Cir 1986) (noting that both RCRA and CERCLA
impose strict liability).
'
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 603 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
12 Over 70 percent of antitrust cases are settled by consent decree, and once an enforcement action is brought, it is generally the defendant who initiates negotiation. This
indicates that the party alleged to be in violation of the statute recognizes that he or she
will probably get a better deal from the Justice Department than from a trial court. See
generally DeBow, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 353-54 (cited in note 70).
27 For a general discussion of how settlements are calculated, see William M. Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61 (1971).
'" National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F2d
1563, 1572 n 5 (DC Cir 1987).
" Id. This problem is very real. There is currently a great deal of ongoing litigation
precipitated by intentionally ambiguous consent decrees. Typically a party will lobby for
an ambiguous provision to allow "foot-dragging" later. More precise drafting of consent
decrees and the certainty that comes from a policy of agency deference could forestall a
great deal of this litigation. See Mengler, 29 BC L Rev at 329 (cited in note 5).
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guage may become more exact.310 There, as here, the costs of
clarity may be offset by fewer costly controversies.
The arbitrary-and-capricious standard will also offer some
protection for the parties' expectations. As formulated by the
Court in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n v State FarmMutual
Automobile Insurance Co., the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
requires submission of a detailed explanation of the agency decision along with the factors considered. 3 ' If the factors considered are not relevant to the statute at issue,'3 2 if the agency
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or if its
offered explanation runs counter to the evidence or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise, then the interpretation will not be
allowed to stand.'33
Parties will adapt to the new paradigm by making agreements more explicit and relying on courts to police the outer
boundaries of allowable policy discretion. It is impossible for
parties entering into consent decrees to avoid unforeseen contingencies. Under the contract model currently in place, courts are
making policy decisions. Although agencies and private parties
may win and lose in equal numbers, this paradigm has significant costs and violates principles of political accountability. Even
if the total number of consent decree settlements were to decline,
the advantages of deference outweigh this loss.
CONCLUSION

The Chevron revolution should include deference to agency
interpretations of regulatory consent decrees. The contract model
has proved inadequate because it ignores the agencies' policy
interests in the efficient enforcement of our public laws. The
institutional advantages that agencies have in greater expertise,
policy-making legitimacy, and electoral accountability all counsel

"2 See Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 311 (cited in note 2) ("Chevron also
places the burden on
Congress to legislate with greater precision if it wants to temper the agencies' new power.").
1 463 US 29, 43 (1983).
'
See, for example, Western Electric, 900 F2d at 299-300.
'
NationalFuel, 811 F2d at 1572. See also Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 745 F2d 281, 291 (4th Cir 1984). In the Chevron context,
several commentators have noted that this standard will still result in some decisions
against agencies. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2105 (cited in note 4), citing Associated
Gas Distributorsv Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 893 F2d 349, 359 (DC Cir 1989).
See also Silberman, 58 Geo Wash L Rev at 827 (cited in note 4).
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for this extension of Chevron. It does not make sense, in attempting to divine congressional intent, to assume that Congress intended agencies to delegate significant policy-making discretion
to courts by entering into consent decrees with third parties.
In addition, a great deal of confusion and unnecessary litigation will be eradicated if courts defer to agencies in interpreting
the ambiguities within consent decrees. Under the standard that
this Comment proposes, deference will be limited by a Chevron
"plain meaning" and "arbitrary-and-capricious" review. This standard will afford meaningful review without unnecessarily hindering the regulatory process. It is superior to contract analysis,
which does not adequately take into account the forward-looking
policy elements involved in consent decree interpretation. Courts
are at a comparative disadvantage, both democratically and in
relative expertise, to adjudicate adequately what are fundamentally policy decisions.

